Appealing Class Action Certification Decisions Under Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 23(F) by Flores, Charles R.
  27
Appealing Class Action Certification Decisions Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) 
Charles R. Flores† 
I. Introduction .........................................................................28 
II. The Modern Class Action....................................................29 
III. General Standards Governing Class Action Certification 
Appeals ..........................................................................................31 
A. The Final Judgment Rule and Its Judicial Exceptions ........31 
B. Statutory Exceptions to the Final Judgment Rule ...............34 
IV. The Development of Rule 23(f) ..........................................39 
V. The Application of Rule 23(f) in the United States Courts of 
Appeals ..........................................................................................41 
A. The Announcement of Rule 23(f) Decision Frameworks ...41 
B.  Accepted Categories of Rule 23(f) Appeals........................44 
1. Plaintiff’s Death Knell ...................................................45 
2. Defendant’s Death Knell................................................46 
3. Legal Development ........................................................49 
4. Substantively Weak Decisions.......................................52 
5. District Court Postures ...................................................54 
6. Public Interest ................................................................56 
7. Hybrid Decisions............................................................56 
VI. Conclusion...........................................................................57 
                                                                                                             
 †  J.D., American University Washington College of Law; B.A., University of Texas 
at Austin. 
28 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:27 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The class action device has always presented a powerful vehicle for 
litigants in federal courts. In addition to its role in presenting otherwise 
underrepresented legal claims, the class action has encouraged the 
growth of a unique community of specialized attorneys whose work 
makes a large contribution to expanding federal dockets. “The 
determination whether or not to certify an action as a class action has 
enormous implications for all the participants—the named parties, the 
absent class members, and the court itself.”1 However, “there are too 
many class actions filed each year for federal appeals courts practicably 
to adjudicate class certification decisions on an interlocutory basis as a 
matter of course.”2 In addition to other statutory grants of appellate 
jurisdiction, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) gives courts of 
appeals a special power to accept certain appeals of class certification 
decisions. 
Although commentators have addressed the standards governing 
Rule 23(f) appeals,3 the jurisprudence has developed significantly in 
                                                                                                             
 1 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1785; 
accord Sperry Rand Corp. v. Larson, 554 F.2d 868, 871 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977) (“The impact 
of a class action determination on the dimensions of the trial and the exposure to liability 
can be enormous.”). 
 2 Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000). (“As a statistical 
point of reference, we observe that according to the Federal Judicial Center, as of 1998 
there were 1,742 active federal cases with class action activity. In 1994, there were only 
816 such cases. A similar rise is reported for this Circuit; in 1998, according to the data, 
there were 221 active cases in this Circuit with class action activity, almost double the 
number of such cases, 114, during 1994. Given these numbers, and the large volume of 
ordinary final judgments that by law must be considered by the courts of appeals, 
routinely granting interlocutory appellate review of class certification decisions is simply 
not practicable.”). 
 3 See Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 211 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2000); 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 1793 (2001); See also, Scott E. Gant, The Law of Unintended Consequences: 
Supreme Court Jurisdiction over Interlocutory Class Certification Rulings, 6 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 249 (2004); Kenneth S. Gould, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): 
Interlocutory Appeals of Class Action Certification Decisions, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
309 (1999); Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(f), a Good Rulemaking, 69 
TENN. L. REV. 97 (2001); Michael L. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to 
Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts 
of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531 (2000); Melissa A. Waters, 
Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate Review for 
the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527 (2002); Carey M. Erhard, Note, A Discussion of 
the Interlocutory Review of Class Action Certification Orders Under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(f), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 151 (2002); Nicole Hitch, Note, Reconsidering 
the Scope and Consequences of Appellate Review in the Certification Decision of Dukes 
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recent years. This paper presents the state of the law under Rule 23(f). 
Part II reviews the basic elements of the modern class action and Part III 
reviews the various grants of the appellate jurisdiction for the courts of 
appeals. Part IV examines the development of Rule 23(f), focusing on 
the Advisory Committee’s work and some decisions concerning the 
Rule’s constitutionality. Part V surveys all cases addressing Rule 23(f) in 
the Courts of Appeals, presenting the current trends with respect to 
procedure, form, and substance, as well as some critical analysis of the 
current Rule 23(f) frameworks. 
II. THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class action suits in all 
federal courts,4 and strictly regulates a litigant’s ability to maintain a 
class action. The party invoking Rule 23 to maintain a class action must 
satisfy two sets of requirements. First, the suit must meet the conjunctive 
requirements of Rule 23(a), which accepts classes only if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.5 
Second, the suit must fall within one or more of Rule 23(b)’s 
prescribed categories of class actions: actions where separate actions 
would adversely affect the class, actions for injunctive or declaratory 
                                                                                                             
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 747 (2005-06); Christopher A. Kitchen, 
Note, Interlocutory Appeal of Class Action Certification Decisions Under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(f): A Proposal for a New Guideline, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
231 (2004); Aimee G. Mackay, Comment, Appealability of Class Certification Orders 
Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(f): Toward a Principled Approach, 96 NW. 
U. L. REV. 755 (2002). 
 4 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996) (“It is settled that if 
the Rule in point is consonant with the Rules Enabling Act . . . and the Constitution, the 
Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary state law.”) (citing Burlington N. R.R. v. 
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 469–74 (1965)); 7A 
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 1758. See generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & 
COOPER, supra note 1, at § 1751 (discussing the English roots and common law evolution 
of class action suits). Special rules govern shareholder derivative suits, FED. R. CIV. P. 
23.1, and unincorporated associations’ suits, FED. R. CIV. P. 23.2. 
 5 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). The Rule 23(a) requirements are commonly referred to as 
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. 
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relief, actions where common questions predominate over individual 
questions, and/or hybrid class actions.6 
Rule 23 vests trial courts with significant discretion in their 
certification decisions. The Rule requires courts to decide whether or not 
to certify a class action “at an early practicable time,”7 and although trial 
courts need not hold evidentiary hearings (extensive or otherwise) on 
class certification questions, many appellate courts express a strong 
preference for such hearings.8 Certification decisions must always 
address the Rule 23 certification prerequisites, and must not rest on a 
consideration of the underlying claim’s merits, per se.9 Nonetheless, 
certification inquiries often present important issues underlying the 
substance of a claim. For example, if a court evaluating certification 
needed to identify the existence of predominant common issues and other 
threshold questions, the court could look beyond the face of the 
pleadings into at least some view of the substantive issues involved.10 
Failure of a class to meet the Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements does not 
necessarily end the action entirely, because courts denying class 
certification may allow the suit to continue against individually named 
litigants.11 In addition, certification decisions are often fluid—”[t]he 
                                                                                                             
 6 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, §§ 1772-
84.1. 
 7 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(a). In addition, both plaintiffs and defendants may move 
for a class certification decision under this rule. 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra 
note 1, §§ 1785, 1785.3. 
 8 E.g., Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.), 471 
F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] district judge has ample discretion to circumscribe both 
the extent of discovery concerning Rule 23 requirements and the extent of a hearing to 
determine whether such requirements are met in order to assure that a class certification 
motion does not become a pretext for a partial trial of the merits.”); Merrill v. S. 
Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600, 608 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Rule 23 does not itself require an 
evidentiary hearing on the question of class certification. However, we have stated on 
numerous occasions that the district court should ordinarily conduct an evidentiary 
hearing on this question.” (citations omitted)); see also 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, 
supra note 1, § 1785. 
 9 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974) (“We find nothing in 
either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be 
maintained as a class action.”). 
 10 Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 320–21 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Class certification 
hearings should not be mini-trials on the merits of the class or individual claims. At the 
same time, however, ‘going beyond the pleadings is necessary, as a court must 
understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to 
make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.’” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996))); see also 7AA 
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 1785. 
 11 E.g., Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 
proper remedy for [the failure to meet certification requirements] is not dismissal of the 
entire action, but rather an order denying class certification and permitting the case to 
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district judge must define, redefine, subclass, and decertify as appropriate 
in response to the progression of the case from assertion to facts.”12 
While a trial court’s selection of legal standards is subject to de novo 
review, a trial court’s application of the correct legal standards is 
reversible only where there is an abuse of discretion.13 
III. GENERAL STANDARDS GOVERNING CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION 
APPEALS 
A. The Final Judgment Rule and Its Judicial Exceptions 
The United States Courts of Appeals possess only that jurisdiction 
which Congress confers upon them by statute.14 Federal statute 28 U.S.C. 
section 1291 establishes one such source of jurisdiction: “The courts of 
appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of 
the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review 
may be had in the Supreme Court.”15 Unlike decisions involving the 
scope of federal jurisdiction generally, which implicate concerns of 
federal power and state sovereignty, the final judgment rule and its 
progeny concern only the distribution of decisionmaking powers among 
the various federal courts.16 Nonetheless, the final judgment rule is of 
enormous import and has earned “deep reverence” from federal courts.17 
While the exact purposes of the rule are difficult to define with precision, 
some general principles are commonly recited: 
[T]he finality rule of § 1291 protects a variety of interests that 
contribute to the efficiency of the legal system. Pretrial appeals 
may cause disruption, delay, and expense for the litigants; they 
also burden appellate courts by requiring immediate 
consideration of issues that may become moot or irrelevant by 
the end of trial. In addition, the finality doctrine protects the 
                                                                                                             
continue as an individual suit.”); see also 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, 
§ 1785. 
 12 Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1983); accord In re General 
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 792–94 (3d Cir. 
1995); 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 1785.4. 
 13 E.g., Heffner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 443 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th 
Cir. 2006). 
 14 Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 399–400 (1957) (“It is axiomatic, as a 
matter of history as well as doctrine, that the existence of appellate jurisdiction in a 
specific federal court over a given type of case is dependent upon authority expressly 
conferred by statute.”) 
 15 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
 16 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 3905. 
 17 Id. at § 3906. 
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strong interest in allowing trial judges to supervise pretrial and 
trial procedures without undue interference.18 
A decision is “final” within the meaning of section 1291 when it 
“ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do 
but execute the judgment.”19 In the class action context, decisions that 
both reject certification and dismiss the suit, or decisions on the merits of 
the underlying class action claim, constitute final judgments which may 
be immediately appealed under section 1291.20 An order that denies class 
certification while allowing the suit to continue as an individual action is 
not a final judgment within the meaning of section 1291.21 Despite 
section 1291’s language, courts have adopted several exceptions to the 
final judgment rule, including the collateral order and death-knell 
doctrines. 
Under the collateral order doctrine, most commonly attributed to 
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,22 an order may be appealed if 
the order “conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, resolve[s] an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and 
[is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”23 The 
Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay held that class 
certification decisions do not qualify as collateral orders because they are 
constantly subject to revision, because they involve significant portions 
of the case’s merits, and because they may always be reviewed after final 
                                                                                                             
 18 Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 (1987); accord 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1985) (citing concerns for 
“efficient judicial administration, . . . the deference appellate courts owe to the district 
judge’s decisions on the many questions of law and fact, . . . unreasonable disruption, 
delay, and expense, . . . [and] the ability of district judges to supervise litigation”); 
Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263–64 (1984) (citing concerns for “the respect 
due trial judges[,] . . . [and] the ability of litigants to harass opponents and to clog the 
courts”); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373–74 (1981) (citing 
concerns for “the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge[,] . . . piecemeal 
appeals [that] would undermine the independence of the district judge[,] . . . harassment 
and cost of a succession of separate appeals[,] . . . [and] efficient judicial 
administration”). 
 19 Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999) (citing Catlin v. 
United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). 
 20 E.g., Nichols v. Mobile Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 675 F.2d 671, 673 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(“A dismissal with prejudice clearly is a decision that ends the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute a judgment.”); Sullivan v. Pac. Indem. Co., 
566 F.2d 444, 445 (3d Cir. 1977) (“To be appealable as an interlocutory matter, the class 
certification decision must involve special circumstances prompting certification by the 
district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and approval by [the Court of Appeals].”). 
 21 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978). 
 22 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 23 Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468–69. 
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judgment.24 The Coopers & Lybrand holding on this issue is firmly 
established in federal courts, eliminating section 1291 as a source of 
appellate jurisdiction over class certification orders. 
For a short time, the final judgment rule also admitted another 
exception: the death knell doctrine: “The ‘death knell’ doctrine assumes 
that without the incentive of a possible group recovery the individual 
plaintiff may find it economically imprudent to pursue his lawsuit to a 
final judgment and then seek appellate review of an adverse class 
determination.”25 Courts adopting the death knell doctrine used a 
“practical rather than a technical construction” of section 1291 to 
determine the likelihood of the suit proceeding as an individual claim 
without class certification. 26 Those courts evaluated the following 
factors: 
[T]he plaintiff’s resources; the size of his claim and his 
subjective willingness to finance prosecution of the claim; the 
probable cost of the litigation and the possibility of joining others 
who will share that cost; and the prospect of prevailing on the 
merits and reversing an order denying class certification.27 
However, in Coopers & Lybrand, the Supreme Court addressed a 
class certification appeal and unanimously held that section 1291 does 
not confer jurisdiction over death knell orders.28 Responding to 
arguments for a separate set of rules regarding class-action certification 
appeals, and with language that presaged Rule 23(f), the Court 
determined that “[t]here are special rules relating to class actions and, to 
that extent, they are a special kind of litigation. Those rules do not, 
however, contain any unique provisions governing appeals.”29 As a 
                                                                                                             
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1966) (“In deciding the 
question of finality the most important competing considerations are the inconvenience 
and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay 
on the other.” (quoting Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152–53 (1964))). 
 27 Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 470 (“[I]f the court believes that the plaintiff has 
adequate incentive to continue, the order is considered interlocutory; but if the court 
concludes that the ruling, as a practical matter, makes further litigation improbable, it is 
considered an appealable final decision.”). Compare Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d at 
119–21 (finding that a $70 claim involving complex claims against a large securities 
dealer and the New York Stock Exchange would not survive a denial of class 
certification), with City of New York v. Int’l Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 298–
99 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding that the City’s “substantial” antitrust claim against pipe 
manufacturers was backed by “adequate resources” and would survive a denial of class 
certification). 
 28 Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469. 
 29 Id. at 470. 
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result, the Court evaluated the death knell doctrine under the general 
section 1291 finality framework to determine whether class certification 
orders fell within “that limited category of orders which, though 
nonfinal, may be appealed without undermining the policies served by 
the general rule [of finality].”30 
Initially, the Court rejected a strain of decisions where courts had 
identified death knell orders by referring to a predetermined threshold of 
a plaintiff’s claim amount. According to Coopers & Lybrand, these 
lower courts had created inconsistent and unprincipled claim thresholds, 
“plainly a legislative, not a judicial, function.”31 Similarly, the Court 
rejected a second strain of decisions where the lower courts had 
identified death knell orders by conducting a case-by-case evaluation to 
determine whether a claim was truly viable without certification. The 
marginal benefit of those decisions was “outweighed by the impact of 
such an individualized jurisdictional inquiry on the judicial system’s 
overall capacity to administer justice.”32 Finally, the Court rejected both 
permutations of the death knell doctrine because of its inherent tendency 
to favor plaintiffs, and because the doctrine threatened a vital purpose of 
the final judgment rule—the balanced relationship between trial and 
appellate courts.33 Thus, “orders relating to class certification are not 
independently appealable under section 1291 prior to judgment.”34 
B. Statutory Exceptions to the Final Judgment Rule 
In addition to the final judgment rule in section 1291, Congress has 
provided a number of potential avenues for appealing class certification 
orders. The Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), provides for 
appeals from certain district court orders: 
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not 
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion 
that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which 
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an 
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing 
in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have 
jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its 
                                                                                                             
 30 Id. at 471. 
 31 Id. at 471–72. 
 32 Id. at 473. The Court emphasized the undesirable need for significant factual 
development and the possibility of multiple burdensome appeals within one certification 
decision. Id. at 473–76. 
 33 Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 476. 
 34 Id. at 470. 
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discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if 
application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the 
order: Provided, however, that application for an appeal 
hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless 
the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall 
so order.35 
Unlike the various permutations of the final judgment rule, section 
1292’s interlocutory appeal framework permits appeals from orders that 
are admittedly not final judgments. To appeal an order with section 
1292(b), the district court must first certify that the order “involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation . . . .”36 
Courts interpret this language not as a set of rigid requirements, per se, 
but as a command to flexibly evaluate the relative worth of allowing 
appeal.37 As a result, trial judges retain wide discretion to certify orders 
under § 1292(b).38 When a district court has made the requisite 
certification, appeal may not be perfected until and unless the court of 
appeals “thereupon, in its discretion, permit[s] an appeal to be taken from 
such order.”39 Unlike the district court’s decision, which the statute 
directs towards at least some substantive criteria, the court of appeals’ 
discretion is without substantial limit. In fact, “[t]he appellate court may 
                                                                                                             
 35 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000). 
 36 Id.; see also 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 3930. 
 37 See Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D.P.R. 1990) (“When 
considering whether to certify an interlocutory appeal, the district court must consider the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of immediate appeal in light of the guidelines 
provided in the statute.”); Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. AT&T, 658 F. Supp. 417, 418 (N.D. 
Ill. 1987). The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted a comparable state rule: 
“Importance depends in large measure on a weighing of probabilities. Importance 
increases with the probability that resolution of the question will have statewide impact 
and the probability of reversal. It increases with the length of the proceedings terminated 
by reversal and with the amount of harm inflicted on the parties by a wrong ruling by the 
trial court. Importance decreases with the probability of affirmance, the probability that 
trial will moot the issue, or the probability that a resolution at variance with that of the 
trial court will not terminate the action or that reversal will not relieve the parties of any 
significant burden.” Emme v. C.O.M.B., Inc., 418 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Minn. 1988) 
(citations omitted). 
 38 See Gottesman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 1959) (“This 
statute was intended to give to the trial judge who is charged with the responsibility of 
facing a future burdened by one of these protracted cases discretion in sending some 
important phase of the case which might materially advance the ultimate termination of 
the litigation to an appellate court for review.”). 
 39 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000). 
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deny the appeal for any reason, including docket congestion.”40 
Nonetheless, class certification decisions are often reviewed under 
section 1292(b), albeit without any strong unifying trend. Although a 
complete survey is beyond the scope of this work, it may be sufficient to 
note that “1292(b) appeals indeed have been used for a wide variety of 
class-action rulings.”41 
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, provides another relevant 
jurisdictional source: “The Supreme Court and all courts established by 
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of 
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles 
of law.”42 Although section 1651 recognizes only those writs “necessary 
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions,”43 the act is “not 
confined to . . . jurisdiction[s] already acquired by appeal but extends to 
those cases which are within its appellate jurisdiction although no appeal 
has been perfected.”44 Section 1651 creates only a narrow power because 
the writs do not serve as substitutes for appeal.45 The writs, both at 
common law and under the federal rules, function to “confine an inferior 
court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to 
exercise its authority” when its duty requires.46 
                                                                                                             
 40 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978). “[Section] 1292 is not a 
panacea, both because it depends to a degree on the indulgence of the court from which 
review is sought and because the discretion to decline to hear an appeal is broad.” Digital 
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 883 n.9 (1994). 
 41 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 3931 (collecting cases); See, e.g., 
Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1016 (5th Cir. 1992) (accepting a section 
1292(b) appeal from an order “defin[ing] the class and class issues, designat[ing] class 
representatives, and set[ing] a trial plan”); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 
1987) (accepting a section 1292(b) appeal from an order denying class certification); 
Henson v. E. Lincoln Twp., 814 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1987) (accepting a section 1292(b) 
appeal from an order denying partition of the defendant class); McKenna v. Champion 
Int’l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1984) (accepting a section 1292(b) appeal from an 
order directing notice to potential class members); Green v. McCall, 710 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 
1983) (accepting a section 1292(b) appeal from an order recognizing personal jurisdiction 
over defendant class members); Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 
1983) (accepting a section 1292(b) appeal from an order recognizing plaintiff’s standing). 
 42 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1949). See generally 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra 
note 1, §§ 3932–3933. 
 43 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 
 44 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943) (“Otherwise the appellate 
jurisdiction could be defeated and the purpose of the statute authorizing the writ thwarted 
by unauthorized action of the district court obstructing the appeal.”). 
 45 Id.; La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957); Bankers Life & Cas. 
Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382–83 (1953). 
 46 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943) (“[A]ppellate courts are 
reluctant to interfere with the decision of a lower court on jurisdictional questions which 
it was competent to decide and which are reviewable in the regular course of appeal.”); 
accord Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 104 (1967) (limiting writs to the function of 
“confin[ing] the lower court to the sphere of its discretionary power”); Bankers Life & 
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Because courts continue to reserve the section 1651 writ power for 
“really extraordinary causes,”47 courts rarely exercise this power to allow 
appeal from class certification decisions.48 In particular, courts reject 
most appeals from class certification decisions brought under section 
1651 because of the district court’s wide discretion in the merits of the 
certification decision,49 and because appeal from the final judgment is 
generally available.50 Courts exercising section 1651 have accepted 
appeals of class action certification orders in only the most extreme 
circumstances, such as a class certification order constituting a “clear 
abuse of discretion . . . inconsistent with any tenable interpretation of 
Rule 23,”51 and a lower court’s “abdication of the judicial function 
depriving the parties of a trial before the court on the basic issues 
involved in the litigation.”52 As a result, section 1651 does not generally 
operate as a reliable method of appealing class action certification orders. 
                                                                                                             
Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953) (“The supplementary review power 
conferred on the courts by Congress in the All Writs Act is meant to be used only in the 
exceptional case where there is clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power” 
(quotations omitted)). 
 47 Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 
258, 260 (1947). 
 48 Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 
2001) (observing that, before the adoption of Rule 23(f) “courts granted writs of 
mandamus to review certification decisions but with an uneasiness that their actions 
stretched the writ’s traditionally restrictive parameters”). 
 49 DeMasi v. Wells, 669 F.2d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1982) (recognizing appeal by writ 
only when “the court in entering a class action order acts outside its jurisdiction” or when 
the court acts “in disregard of appropriate procedural safeguards”) (citation omitted); In 
re Allegheny Corp., 634 F.2d 1148, 1149–51 (8th Cir. 1980); J. H. Cohn & Co. Self-
Employment Ret. Trust v. Am. Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 628 F.2d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(“Since all that is at issue is mandamus relief it is sufficient to note that a decision to 
certify a class action rests in the discretion of the district court, and that the district court 
did not usurp its judicial power or indisputably abuse its discretion in ruling not to certify 
the class.” (citations omitted)); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lord, 585 F.2d 860, 865 (8th 
Cir. 1978) (“[T]he remedy of mandamus remains available in those extraordinary 
instances when the district court, in granting the maintenance of a class action, has 
exceeded the sphere of its discretionary power.”) (citation omitted). 
 50 See In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 159 (6th Cir. 1993) (rejecting an attempt to appeal 
a class certification order because “class certification is clearly reviewable on direct 
appeal once a final disposition of the case has been reached.”). At least one court has 
suggested that review by writ of a class certification decision is never appropriate. See In 
re Catwaba Indian Tribe of S.C., 973 F.2d 1133, 1137 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 51 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 
1975). 
 52 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957) (confronting “a refusal on 
his [petitioner’s] part, as a judge, to try the causes in due course”); see also Rodgers v. 
U.S. Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 162 (3d Cir. 1975) (confronting an “across-the-board 
prohibition of communication” with potential members of the class by the plaintiffs or 
their attorneys). In at least one case, the Court approved the use of mandamus in less 
drastic circumstances. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964) (approving the 
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Rule 54(b) provides another potential source of appellate 
jurisdiction over class certification appeals: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct 
the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all 
of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for 
the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the 
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties.53 
Rule 54(b)’s requirement of an express determination and direction 
makes identification of appealable orders relatively simple for litigants.54 
District courts applying Rule 54’s determination and direction 
prerequisites must make separate and distinct inquiries.55 The district 
court must identify a claim that is “‘final’ in the sense that it is ‘an 
ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a 
multiple claims action.’”56  Most importantly for the consideration of 
class certification orders, Rule 54(b)’s “final judgments” and section 
1291’s “final decisions” represent an identical set of decisions.57 That is, 
“[t]he District Court cannot, in the exercise of its discretion, treat as 
‘final’ that which is not ‘final’ within the meaning of section 1291.”58 
                                                                                                             
use of mandamus to review “the basic, undecided question of whether a district court 
could order the mental or physical examination of a defendant”). 
 53 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See generally 10 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, 
§§ 2653–2661. 
 54 Indeed, the creation of a clear and unambiguous result for litigants was an 
important purpose of the Rule. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 
512 (1950) (analyzing the Advisory Committee’s work on Rule 54). 
 55 Gen. Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp, Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Rule 
54(b) certification requires two independent findings.” (emphasis added)). “The 
determination that a particular order ultimately disposes of a separable claim is a question 
of law reviewed de novo, while the finding of no just reason for delay is only reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 1027. 
 56 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980) (citation omitted). 
 57 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956); see 10 WRIGHT, 
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 2658.1 (comparing the principles animating § 1291 
and Rule 54(b)). 
 58 Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 U.S. at 437. “Rule 54(b) . . . does not supersede any 
statute controlling appellate jurisdiction. It scrupulously recognizes the statutory 
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As a result, the Coopers & Lybrand holding that class certification 
decisions are not “final decisions” forecloses both section 1291 and Rule 
54(b) as means of appealing these orders.59 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 23(F) 
The Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 created the 
Supreme Court’s authority to “prescribe rules . . . to provide for an 
appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not 
otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d)” of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292.60 In 1998, the Supreme Court exercised this new power for the 
first time by promulgating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): 
(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an 
appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class 
action certification under this rule if application is made to it 
within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not stay 
proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the 
court of appeals so orders.61 
The Advisory Committee notes accompanying 23(f) anticipate the 
creation of new substantive standards of appeal under 23(f): “The court 
of appeals is given unfettered discretion whether to permit the appeal, 
akin to the discretion exercised by the Supreme Court in acting on a 
petition for certiorari.”62 In addition to appeals involving “novel or 
unsettled question[s] of law,” the Advisory Committee approved of two 
                                                                                                             
requirement of a ‘final decision’ under section 1291 as a basic requirement for an appeal 
to the Court of Appeals.”  Id. at 438; accord Oestreicher v. Am. Nat’l. Stores, Inc., 225 
S.E.2d 797, 802–05 (N.C. 1976) (interpreting a state rule parallel to Rule 54(b) with 
federal jurisprudence). 
 59 Minority Police Officers Ass’n. v. City of S. Bend, 721 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1983); 
accord James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (asserting 
that denials of class certification are “not final judgments severable for immediate appeal 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), but interlocutory orders”); Akerman v. Oryx Commc’ns, Inc., 810 
F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting a district court’s 54(b) certification of a class 
certification order); West v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 558 F.2d 977, 982 (1977) 
(“If section 1291 does not apply because of the lack of finality, recourse may not be had 
to Rule 54(b) because it applies only to a ‘final judgment.’”). 
 60 Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 § 101, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2000); see 
generally 4 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 1, § 1007 (tracking the work of the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from 1958 to present). 
 61 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 62 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note. According to the Committee, 
“[t]he courts of appeals will develop standards for granting review that reflect the 
changing areas of uncertainty in class litigation.”  Id. “Permission to appeal may be 
granted or denied on the basis of any consideration that the court of appeals finds 
persuasive.” Id. 
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additional types of class certification appeals.63 First, the Committee 
approved of appeals from class certification decisions that resemble the 
plaintiff’s death knell doctrine—where “the only sure path to appellate 
review is by proceeding to final judgment on the merits of an individual 
claim that, standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of litigation.”64 
Second, the Committee approved of appeals from orders granting 
certification where the defendant is forced “to settle rather than incur the 
costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous 
liability.”65 The Committee predicted that “[p]ermission is most likely to 
be granted when the certification decision turns on a novel or unsettled 
question of law, or when, as a practical matter, the decision on 
certification is likely dispositive of the litigation.”66 
Both Rule 23(f)’s text and accompanying notes suggest a grant of 
appellate review that differs significantly from other statutory grants of 
appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders. Rule 23(f) differs from 
section 1292(b) in two respects. Unlike section 1292(b), which requires 
district court certification of class certification orders, Rule 23(f) “does 
not require that the district court certify the certification ruling for 
appeal.”67 Additionally, unlike section 1292(b), which permits appeal 
only where there exists a “controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference,”68 Rule 23(f) contains no such limit. 
Despite some apparent overlap, courts consistently refuse to interpret 
Rule 23(f) as a repeal or supercession of section 1292(b).69 Nor does 
Rule 23(f) limit its scope like the All Writs Act, which grants the power 
to issue only those writs “necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions.”70 Under Rule 23(f), “[p]ermission to appeal 
may be granted or denied on the basis of any consideration that the court 
of appeals finds persuasive.”71 
                                                                                                             
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. District courts may, nonetheless, speak to the issue in an assisting or advisory 
capacity. Id. According to the Committee, “a statement of reasons bearing on the 
probable benefits and costs of immediate appeal can help focus the court of appeals[’] 
decision, and may persuade the disappointed party that an attempt to appeal would be 
fruitless.” Id. 
 68 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000). 
 69 See Panache Bd. of Pa. v. Richardson Elecs., Ltd., No. 90-C-6400, 1999 WL 
1024560, *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 1999) (“Rule 23(f) was enacted to expand the ways for 
taking an interlocutory appeal, and it contains a different structure and procedure than 
section 1292(b).”). 
 70 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000). 
 71 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note. 
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The Fifth Circuit confronted a direct constitutional challenge to 
Rule 23(f) in Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., where the respondent 
asserted that “28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), the authorizing authority for Rule 
23(f), exceeds the scope of rulemaking power that Congress may 
permissibly delegate to the Supreme Court because only Congress, not 
the Court, may confer jurisdiction on the lower federal courts.”72 The 
court narrowed the question to whether Rule 23(f) is an expansion of 
jurisdiction, which poses significant constitutional questions with respect 
to Article III, or whether the rule is an acceptable grant of “rulemaking 
authority over the courts’ own practices.”73 After surveying recent 
rulemaking practices, the court concluded that “none of these rules, 
including Rule 23(f), affect the matters reviewable by the courts of 
appeals.”74 Instead, “[t]hey affect only when those courts may hear the 
appeals, an issue apart from the right to confer original jurisdiction on 
the lower federal courts.”75 Since that decision, the constitutional 
propriety of Rule 23(f) has gone unchallenged. 
V. THE APPLICATION OF RULE 23(F) IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF 
APPEALS 
This Part surveys all published cases addressing Rule 23(f) in the 
Courts of Appeals.76 Several issues arise during Rule 23(f) decisions 
which merit independent consideration: announcement of Rule 23(f) 
decision frameworks; procedure under Rule 23(f); and the accepted 
categories of Rule 23(f) appeals. 
A. The Announcement of Rule 23(f) Decision Frameworks 
Apart from the question of whether or not to grant a Rule 23(f) 
appeal, the courts of appeals (and judges within the courts) diverge on 
the question of whether or not to announce the reasons for accepting or 
rejecting a Rule 23(f) appeal. In many decisions, courts simply note near 
the factual recitation that appeal was granted (or denied) pursuant to Rule 
23(f), without more discussion. With one recent exception,77 the Fifth 
Circuit has never announced the substantive grounds which guide its 
Rule 23(f) decisions.78 After initial decisions outlining general categories 
                                                                                                             
 72 Bolin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 973 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 73 Id. at 974. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 This article does not include cases published after Sept. 25, 2007. 
 77 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 
(5th Cir. 2007). 
 78 See Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 493 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2007); Oscar 
Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007); Cole v. 
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of accepted appeals, the overwhelming majority of Fourth79 and Eleventh 
Circuit80 decisions do not specifically address why any individual case 
merited a Rule 23(f) appeal under their frameworks. This practice 
subsists even in circuits, such as the Seventh, that have developed a 
significant set of Rule 23(f) acceptance jurisprudence,81 suggesting that 
not all judges feel bound to the analytical framework to which their 
circuit colleagues may adhere. 82 The development of accepted categories 
                                                                                                             
Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2007); Langbecker v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 
476 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2006); Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 
601 (5th Cir. 2006); Feder v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 429 F.3d 125, 127 (5th Cir. 2005); 
Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2005); Krim v. 
pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 493 n.10 (5th Cir. 2005); Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 
F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 2005); Robinson v. Tex. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 387 F.3d 416, 419 
(5th Cir. 2004); Bratcher v. Nat’l Standard Life Ins. Co. (In re Monumental Life Ins. 
Co.), 365 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Bratcher, 543 
U.S. 870 (2004); In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 2003), 
withdrawn and reh’g denied and reh’g en banc denied, 369 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 
2004); Bell Atl. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 301 (5th Cir. 2003); Sandwich Chef 
of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205, 215 (5th Cir. 2003); Rivera 
v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 283 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2002); Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 263 
F.3d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 2001); Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 478 
(5th Cir. 2001); Bertulli v. Indep. Ass’n of Control Pilots, 242 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 
2001); Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 241 F.3d 417, 418 (5th Cir. 2001); Bolin v. Sears 
Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 972 (5th Cir. 2000); Reyna v. Johnson, 176 F. App’x 459, 
460 (5th Cir. 2006); Corley v. Orangefield Indep. Sch. Dist., 152 F. App’x 350, 353 (5th 
Cir. 2005); White v. Imperial Adjustment Corp., 75 F. App’x 972, 973 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 79 See Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2006); Gregory 
v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2006); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 
368 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2004); Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 
2003). 
 80 See Heffner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 443 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 
2006); Gilchrist v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 390 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2004); Cliff 
v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2004); Valley Drug Co. v. 
Geneva Pharms. Inc., 350 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2003); London v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
340 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003); City of Hialeah v. Rojas, 311 F.3d 1096 (11th Cir. 
2002); Heimmermann v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 305 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Franze v. Equitable Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2002); Piazza v. Ebscoe Indus., 
Inc., 273 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2001); Shin v. Cobb County Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 1061 
(11th Cir. 2001); Turner v. Beneficial Corp., 236 F.3d 643 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’d en 
banc, 242 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir. 2001); Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 
1228 (11th Cir. 2000); Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 
2000); Grimes v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., No. 06-14363, 2007 WL 245128 (11th Cir. Jan. 
30, 2007); Drayton v. W. Auto Supply Co., No. 01-10415, 2002 WL 32508918 (11th Cir. 
Mar. 11, 2002). 
 81 See Gates v. Towery, 430 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 82 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007); Lindsay v. Gov’t 
Employees Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625 
(D.C. Cir. 2006); Love v. Johanns, 439 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Miles v. Merrill Lynch 
& Co., Inc. (In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig.), 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006); Beck v. Maximus, 
Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 2006); Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 
2007] Appealing Class Action Certifications Under FRCP 23(f) 43 
of appeals takes place only in circuits where courts specifically articulate 
them in decisions. Often, the leading case in each circuit attempts to 
identify the most favorable framework, and subsequent decisions make 
short reference to whatever category is most apposite, with some citation 
and factual analysis. 
By far the most concerning development in Rule 23(f) acceptance 
jurisprudence is this practice of announcing Rule 23(f) decisions without 
significant legal or factual analysis. As one commentator noted, “‘hiding 
the ball’ from litigants by never stating when Rule 23(f) jurisdiction will 
be exercised is inappropriate: courts must give clear signals to litigants as 
to when and how the law works, for that is the very essence of what a 
court does.”83 Moreover, the absence of articulated reasons for 
acceptance may discourage deserving appeals, and may also (and 
probably more commonly) encourage litigants to file undeserving 
appeals.84 In contrast, even minimal articulations of Rule 23(f) decisions 
provide guidance for litigants who wish to determine whether to appeal 
or not, as well as litigants who wish to tailor their applications to 
something more than broad categorical analysis. In addition to 
consistency among circuits, consistency within circuits is also a desirable 
                                                                                                             
F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2006); Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d 
1266, 1271-77 (11th Cir. 2000)); Bowe v. Polymedica Corp. (In re Polymedica Corp. 
Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005); Stuebler v. Xcelera.com (In re Xcelera.com 
Sec. Litig.), 430 F.3d 503, 507 (1st Cir. 2005); Simon II Litig. v. Philip Morris USA Inc. 
(In re Simon II Litig.), 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005); Carroll v. United Compucred 
Collections, Inc., 399 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2005); Gates v. Towery, 430 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 
2005); In re Chiang, 385 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2004); Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors 
Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2004); Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 498 (6th 
Cir. 2004); Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2004); Parker v. Time 
Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 2003); De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 
F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2003); Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 
1022 (9th Cir. 2003); Winoff Indus., Inc. v. Stone Container Corp., (In re Linerboard 
Antitrust Litig.), 305 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2002); Colbert v. Dymacol, Inc., 302 F.3d 
155 (3d Cir. 2002); McKowan Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine, Ltd., 295 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 
2002); Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2002); Nat’l Asbestos 
Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 270 F.3d 984 (2d Cir. 2001); Johnston v. 
HBO Film Mgmt., Inc., 265 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2001); In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 
F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2001); Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 
(9th Cir. 2001); Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Scott v. Dennis Reimer Co., L.P.A., 205 F.3d 1341 (6th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Univ. of 
Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000); Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 84 
F. App’x 257 (3d Cir. 2004); Monahan v. City of Wilmington, 49 F. App’x 383, 384 (3d 
Cir. 2002); Rodney v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 146 F. App’x 783 (6th Cir. 2005); Durant v. 
Servicemaster Co., 109 F. App’x 27, 29 (6th Cir. 2004); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., 
Inc., No. 01-80253, 2002 WL 32615336 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2002). 
 83 Mackay, supra note 3, at 794. 
 84 See id. at 795. 
44 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:27 
goal for Rule 23(f) jurisprudence.85 “Telling litigants what the law is, and 
telling them the rules for using the law must be at the top of the courts’ 
priorities.”86 
B.  Accepted Categories of Rule 23(f) Appeals 
The Seventh Circuit was the first to encounter Rule 23(f) in Blair v. 
Equifax Check Services,87 where the court drew on the “reasons 23(f) 
came into being” to outline a framework for identifying acceptable Rule 
23(f) appeals.88 Several courts follow this circuit’s jurisprudence closely, 
while others diverge significantly. Especially in early Rule 23(f) 
decisions, courts rejected the notion of a “bright-line approach” or 
“catalog of factors” that would guide Rule 23(f) appeal decisions.89 The 
circuits generally “leave open the possibility that a petition failing to 
satisfy [the enumerated] requirements may nevertheless be granted where 
it presents special circumstances that militate in favor of an immediate 
appeal.”90 Nonetheless, several categories of Rule 23(f) appeals have 
                                                                                                             
 85 See Mackay, supra note 3, at 796 (“When different panels choose whether to 
accept or deny appeals on different bases, litigants are left to wonder about the 
importance of the rule of law.”) 
 86 Id. 
 87 Blair v. Equifax Check Serv., 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 88 Blair, 181 F.3d at 833–34; accord Regents v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), 
Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2007) (beginning Rule 23(f) analysis with committee 
notes); Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); In re 
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 99–100 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same); 
In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 2002) (same); Newton v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); In re 
Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 
2001) (same); Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 2000) (same). 
 89 See Blair, 181 F.3d at 833–34; accord Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 960 (“[W]e simply 
set forth factors for consideration and do not circumscribe the court’s evaluation of the 
strength of showing required for any individual factor.”); In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 
at 959 (6th Cir. 2002); Newton, 259 F.3d at 164; Isaacs v. Sprint Corp., 261 F.3d 679 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (“It is doubtful that the creation of such a list would be a desirable 
undertaking. . . .”); Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1276 (“[T]here may well be special 
circumstances that lead us to grant or deny a Rule 23(f) petition even where some or all 
of the relevant factors point to a different result. Moreover, none of the foregoing factors 
is necessarily conclusive. . . .”); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 
294 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that special circumstances may 
lead us either to deny leave to appeal in cases that seem superficially to fit into one of 
these three pigeonholes, or conversely, to grant leave to appeal in cases that do not match 
any of the three described categories.”). Nor have courts favored importing the Supreme 
Court’s standards for granting writs of certiorari. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 208 
F.3d at 293 (rejecting an attempt to “transplant the certiorari standard root and branch 
into the virgin soil of Rule 23(f)”). 
 90 In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 262 F.3d at 140; accord In re Lorazepam & 
Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d at 103 (“We do not foreclose the possibility that 
special circumstances may lead us either to deny leave to appeal in cases that seem 
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earned consistent support among particular circuits, as well as the 
circuits generally. Either as stand alone justifications for accepting an 
appeal, or as part of a factor driven balancing test,91 these categories 
merit independent analysis because of their self-contained justifications. 
Every circuit requires that the party invoking Rule 23(f) justify the 
court’s exercise of appellate review.92 
1. Plaintiff’s Death Knell 
The first category of accepted Rule 23(f) appeals includes orders 
presenting the plaintiff’s death knell. Citing Coopers & Lybrand,93 the 
Blair court asserted that it would accept Rule 23(f) appeals of class 
certifications where the denial of class status would “sound[] the death 
knell of the litigation, because the representative plaintiff’s claim is too 
small to justify the expense of litigation.”94 However, Blair does not 
purport to accept appeals where “law firms with portfolios of litigation” 
may act as “champions for the class even if the representative plaintiff 
would find it uneconomical to carry on with the case.”95 Several other 
circuits accept Rule 23(f) appeals in cases of a plaintiff’s death knell.96 
As a result of this and other complexities, no decision is more 
                                                                                                             
superficially to fit into one of these [] pigeonholes, or conversely, to grant leave to appeal 
in cases that do not match any of the three described categories.”) (quoting Waste Mgmt. 
Holdings, 208 F.3d at 294). 
 91 See, e.g., In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d at 959 (“[A] court of appeals has broad 
discretion to grant or deny a Rule 23(f) petition, and any pertinent factor may be weighed 
in the exercise of that discretion.”); Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 142–46 
(4th Cir. 2001); Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1276 (“[O]rdinarily, each relevant factor 
should be balanced against the others, taking into account any unique facts and 
circumstances.”). 
 92 See, e.g., Blair, 181 F.3d at 835. 
 93 437 U.S. 463 (1978). 
 94 Blair, 181 F.3d at 834. 
 95 Blair, 181 F.3d at 834 (citing Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 
1991)). 
 96 See In re James, 444 F.3d 643, 645–46 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamberlan v. Ford 
Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2005); Barabin v. Aramark Corp., No. 02-8057, 
2003 WL 355417, (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 2003); Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 
2003); Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2003); In re Delta Air 
Lines, 310 F. 3d 953, 960 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Allstate Ins. Co., No. 02-8010, 2002 WL 
31545753 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 2002); In re Bioproducts, Inc., No. 02-8006, 2002 WL 
1997993 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2002); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 
F.3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 
F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001); Lienhart v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 
2001); In re Sumitomo Copper Litigation v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 
139-40 (2d Cir. 2001); Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2000) (accepting 
23(f) appeals “when a doubtful class certification ruling would virtually compel a party to 
abandon a potentially meritorious claim or defense before trial”). 
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problematic than the factual determination of whether a class 
certification decision presents a death knell for a particular litigant. In 
addition to the difficulty of identifying the relevant litigation resources, 
Blair and other courts do not fully address how courts should establish 
thresholds of economic viability. Some circuits suggest that courts 
analyze the “size of the putative class,” “record evidence regarding the 
financial resources of the parties,” “the existence and potential impact of 
related litigation,” the “nature of the remedy sought in the case,” and “in 
damages cases, the amount of money potentially recoverable.”97 
Relative to Rule 23(f)’s committee notes’ emphasis on death knells, 
the number of Rule 23(f) appeals actually granted because of a plaintiff’s 
death knell is strikingly small. Without precise Rule 23(f) analysis, the 
First Circuit identified one plaintiff’s death knell in a suit challenging a 
cellular phone company’s billing practices.98 While the named plaintiff 
alleged that the company had erroneously billed only one phone call, the 
potential class involved the same form of erroneous billing with respect 
to tens of thousands of customers in Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire.99 In comparison to the cases accepting appeal because of a 
defendant’s death knell, the Coopers & Lybrand prediction that death 
knells would operate to favor plaintiffs100 has not come to pass. 
2. Defendant’s Death Knell 
Courts also accept appeals from orders creating the defendant’s 
death knell. Blair recognized that class certification sometimes forces 
defendants with meritorious defenses to settle,101 and that the procedural 
pressures of class certifications had spawned unjustified revisions of 
substantive law.102 To combat the warping of class certification 
decisions, this category accepts Rule 23(f) appeals where “the stakes are 
large and the risk of a settlement or other disposition that does not reflect 
the merits of the claim is substantial.”103 With some exceptions, this 
                                                                                                             
 97 Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 98 Smilow, 323 F.3d at 32. “This court will normally grant Rule 23(f) review when a 
class decertification ruling, apparently premised on an abuse of discretion by the district 
court, would have the practical effect of compelling a party to abandon a potentially 
meritorious claim. . . . That is the situation here.” Id. at 37 n.4. 
 99 Smilow, 323 F.3d at 34–37. 
 100 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 101 Blair, 181 F.3d at 834 (observing that class certification often forces settlements 
out of two key groups: “risk-averse corporate executives” and “defendants whose legal 
positions are justified but unpopular”). 
 102 Blair, 181 F.3d at 834 (citing Hal S. Scott, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 
10b-5, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1971)). 
 103 Blair, 181 F.3d at 835; accord Regents v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 
482 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2007); In re James, 444 F.3d 643, 645–46 (D.C. Cir. 2006); 
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category almost always involves certification of a class of plaintiffs, not 
defendants.104 With respect to procedural burdens, courts generally treat 
defendants’ death knells and plaintiffs’ death knells similarly. Some 
circuits require parties claiming a death knell to show, beyond a “general 
assertion,” that the claim or defense would not be pursued,105 while 
others require specific “evidence that the damages claimed would force a 
company of its size to settle without relation to the merits of the class’s 
claims.”106 
The Seventh Circuit argued that review under the defendant’s death 
knell category was justified in a breach of warranty suit that involved 
$200,000 without certification, but $200,000,000 with certification.107 
The court argued that “[s]uch a claim puts a bet-your-company decision 
to [the company’s] managers and may induce a substantial settlement 
even if the customers’ position is weak.”108 In a later case, the Seventh 
Circuit found that an order allowing unnamed class members “one-way 
intervention” placed “enormous” pressure on the defendant to settle.109 
The court also accepted review in a product liability case involving sixty 
million automobile tires because certification created “the risk of a 
                                                                                                             
Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2005); Klay v. Humana, Inc., 
382 F.3d 1241, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (referring indirectly to the grounds for granting the 
23(f) petition as “settlement pressure”); Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2004); Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2003); Barabin v. Aramark Corp., No. 
02-8057, 2003 WL 355417, (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 2003); In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F. 3d 953, 
960 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Allstate Ins. Co., No. 02-8010, 2002 WL 31545753 (D.C. Cir. 
Nov. 14, 2002); In re Veneman, 309 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 2002); In re Bioproducts, Inc., 
No. 02-8006, 2002 WL 1997993 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2002); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Lorazepam 
& Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Isaacs v. Sprint Corp., 261 
F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2001); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th 
Cir. 2001); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 
2001); Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2001); In re Sumitomo 
Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, 
Inc., v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit also linked the 
defendant’s death knell to “prompt resolution of the issue,” arguing that the positive 
relationship between the two militates in favor of accepting an appeal. Carnegie v. 
Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 104 See Tilley, 345 F.3d at 38 (arguing that certification of class of defendants rarely 
merits an individual defendant’s 23(f) appeal). “In the unlikely event that certification 
places inexorable settlement pressure on a particular class of defendants, the special 
circumstances/manifest injustice exception is sufficiently flexible to afford relief.” Id. 
 105 In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 960 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 106 In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d at 108. 
 107 Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 108 Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675. The Szabo decision did not compartmentalize the Blair 
factors, and referred to multiple justifications for 23(f) review. Id. 
 109 Isaacs, 261 F.3d at 681. 
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catastrophic judgment,” virtually ensuring the defendant’s settlement.110 
The First Circuit identified a defendant’s death knell where two counties 
faced damages liability for strip-searching prison inmates over the course 
of nearly a decade.111 The Fifth Circuit also identified “particularly 
acute” settlement pressure where a class of plaintiffs attempted to hold a 
bank liable for “the entirety of securities losses stemming from the Enron 
collapse.”112 
In a rare articulated rejection, the Eleventh Circuit found no 
defendant’s death knell where an admittedly large plaintiff class sought 
only declaratory and injunctive relief, such that certification would leave 
the defendant’s monetary exposure unchanged.113 Similarly, the D.C. 
Circuit rejected a defendant’s death knell argument because the class had 
been certified only with respect to injunctive, not monetary relief.114 The 
Ninth Circuit rejected a defendant’s death knell because the litigant 
“made no showing that it lacks the resources to defend this case to a 
conclusion and appeal if necessary or that doing so would run the risk of 
ruinous liability.”115 Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit rejected a death knell 
appeal where class damages for an airline company involved close to one 
billion dollars.116 
Because of Coopers & Lybrand’s great influence on the 
development of Rule 23(f),117 its critiques of the death knell doctrine 
provide an important starting point for normative evaluations of circuit 
practice under Rule 23(f). One of Coopers & Lybrand’s strongest 
critiques was that “the ‘death knell’ doctrine . . . authorizes 
indiscriminate interlocutory review of decisions made by the trial 
judge.”118  This criticism has proven to be at least partially true in both 
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ death knells. The large set of decisions 
accepting Rule 23(f) appeals without explanation does nothing to reduce 
(and may even contribute to) the appearance of indiscriminate decision- 
                                                                                                             
 110 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d at 1015–16. 
 111 Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Although we thought it 
quite possible that the certification orders would survive review, the financial and similar 
information provided by the two counties in this case persuaded us to grant interlocutory 
review, which we expedited.”). 
 112 Regents v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
 113 Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1277 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 114 In re Veneman, 309 F.3d 789, 794 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 115 Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotations omitted) (“Ford’s claims are conclusory and are not backed up by 
declarations, documents, or other evidence demonstrating potential liability or financial 
condition.”). 
 116 In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 960–61 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 117 See infra Part IIIA. 
 118 Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 474. 
2007] Appealing Class Action Certifications Under FRCP 23(f) 49 
making in Rule 23(f) acceptances. Meanwhile, the decisions advancing 
some justification for death knell cases have failed to develop any set of 
refined principles or standards to guide their decisions. In particular, no 
circuit has successfully established any threshold of economic viability. 
Instead, the courts rely on an ad hoc evaluative process characterized by 
vague procedural burdens and varying substantive requirements, which 
makes the availability of death knell appeals unpredictable for litigants. 
3. Legal Development 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Blair also led the courts of 
appeals in accepting Rule 23(f) appeals that “facilitate the development 
of the law” in important areas that might otherwise evade appellate 
review.119 The legal development category places little weight on the 
“shak[iness]” of district certification decisions,120 and accepts Rule 23(f) 
appeals where the order presents an important question of law that is 
likely to “escape effective disposition at the end of the case,” even if the 
appeal results in a swift affirmation or reversal.121 Some decisions under 
this category determine the evasion of review by comparing the number 
of district court decisions on a given question to the number of appellate 
decisions on that same question.122 Other decisions cite subject-matter-
                                                                                                             
 119 Blair, 181 F.3d at 835 (noting that the large proportion of settlements and other 
non-merits dispositions leaves “some fundamental issues about class actions poorly 
developed”); accord Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(framing the category to include appeals where “the legal question is important, 
unresolved, and has managed to escape resolution by appeals from final judgments”). 
 120 Blair, 181 F.3d at 835; accord Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 897. 
 121 Blair, 181 F.3d at 835; accord Regents v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 
482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Household Int’l Tax Reduction Plan, 441 F.3d 500 
(7th Cir. 2006); In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2005); Carnegie v. 
Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2004); Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 
358 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004); Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Barabin v. Aramark Corp., No. 02-8057, 2003 WL 355417, (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 2003); 
Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003); In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d at 1015–16; West v. 
Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Rand Corp., No. 02-8007, 
2002 WL 1461810 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2002); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust 
Litig., 289 F.3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 
280 F.3d 124, 132 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais 
Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] novel legal question will not 
compel immediate review unless it is of fundamental importance to the development of 
the law of class actions and it is likely to escape effective review after entry of final 
judgment.”); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001); 
Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 122 Dechert v. Cadle Co., 333 F.3d 801, 802 (7th Cir. 2003) (“There are no appellate 
cases on the question, although our decision in [an earlier case] bears on it.”); Szabo, 249 
F.3d at 675 (“At critical junctures the district judge cited only decisions by other district 
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specific phenomenon, such as a tendency for securities class action 
defendants to be particularly risk averse to settle in the face of weak 
plaintiffs,123 while others make no specific argument as to why review is 
particularly evasive.124 Conversely, courts reject appeals under this 
category because they present questions of fact more than law,125 because 
review of even a sufficiently important question is available on appeal 
from the final judgment,126 and because the law in question is already 
“well-settled.”127 
The First Circuit purports to adopt a stricter approach than others, 
expressing concern that “disappointed litigants” with “creative lawyers 
almost always will be able to argue that deciding her case would clarify 
some ‘fundamental’ issue.’”128 Other circuits share similar concerns, 
finding it “relatively easy for a litigant to identify some question of law 
implicated by the class certification decision and in good faith 
                                                                                                             
judges, most in cases later settled and thus not subject to appellate consideration.”); 
Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 897 (“Both sides cite a welter of district court decisions (many in 
this circuit) addressing the subject, but none has reached this court since the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, and only one has reached another court of appeals.”); Blair, 181 F.3d at 835 
(“That neither side can point to any precedent in support of its position implies that this is 
one of the issues that has evaded appellate resolution, and the issue is important enough 
to justify review now.”). 
 123 West, 282 F.3d at 938. The West court provides an unusually specific account of 
the potential for evasion, citing several specific studies of the issue. See also Hevesi v. 
Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 124 See Regents v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 
2007); In re Household Int’l Tax Reduction Plan, 441 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2006); Murray 
v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006); In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 
505 (7th Cir. 2005); Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2004); Allen 
v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 470 (7th Cir. 2004) (asserting, without 
elaboration, that the “questions that have escaped resolution on appeal from final 
decisions”); Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 81 F. App’x 550, 553 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(accepting review of “a matter of first impression in this circuit and one concerning 
which our sister circuits disagree”); In re Veneman, 309 F.3d 789, 795 (D.C. Cir. 2002); 
In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 132 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Mejdrech, 319 F.3d at 910–11 (observing that “the case law is sparse and divided” on the 
appealed issue, and citing conflicting out of circuit cases); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc., 288 F.3d at 1015–16. 
 125 Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 82 (2d Cir. 2004) (contrasting a “legal 
decision that we review de novo” with a judge’s “managerial judgment that is entitled to 
deference”); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 109 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (“Mylan argues that the district court erred in applying the standards of Rule 23 to 
the facts of this case, but Mylan does not aver that the district court lacked established 
law to guide it in that task.”) (emphasis added). 
 126 In re Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 142 
(2d Cir. 2001) (finding that the party seeking review failed to show any evasion, and that 
“that, alone, establishes an adequate basis to deny the petition”) 
 127 In re Rand Corp., No. 02-8007, 2002 WL 1461810 at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2002). 
 128 Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 294 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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characterize that question as novel or unsettled.”129 In order to make Rule 
23(f) appeals “the exception, not the rule,” these circuits argue that 
“Blair’s [legal development] category should be restricted to those 
instances in which an appeal will permit the resolution of an unsettled 
legal issue that is important to the particular litigation as well as 
important in itself and likely to escape effective review if left hanging 
until the end of the case.”130 Thus, courts reject appeals presenting 
otherwise important issues when the issue is only remotely related to the 
actual district court certification decision.131 Beyond the abstract concept 
of importance, the Eleventh Circuit argues that appeals are more 
deserving when they present issues that evade review, when they involve 
issues presented in similar simultaneous litigation, when they involve 
governmental entities, and/or when they involve pure questions of law.132 
Other courts take time to explain the importance of a particular 
substantive issue to a particular set of litigants.133 
Courts utilizing this category have reviewed myriad class action 
issues: the relationship between multiple simultaneous class actions;134 
whether certain Title VII suits are more appropriately brought under Rule 
23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3);135 whether judges must accept a complaint’s 
allegations for the purpose of a certification decision;136 the reaches of 
                                                                                                             
 129 Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 130 Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293–94 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(emphasis added); accord Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2004); 
Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 81 F. App’x 550, 553 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Delta 
Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 960 (6th Cir. 2002); Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 
952, 959 (9th Cir. 2005); In re James, 444 F.3d 643, 645–46 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re 
Sodexho Marriott Servs., No. 02-8008, 2003 WL 22299806 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 25, 2003); In 
re Allstate Ins. Co., No. 02-8010, 2002 WL 31545753 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 2002); In re 
Veneman, 309 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 2002); In re Bioproducts, Inc., No. 02-8006, 2002 WL 
1997993 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2002); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 
F.3d 98, 99–100 (D.C. Cir. 2002); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 262 F.3d at 142–43; 
Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1275 (quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings). 
 131 Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 132 Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1275–76. 
 133 See, e.g., Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The 
application of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in a novel context can have a significant 
effect on the law of class actions because the presumption of reliance created by the 
doctrine is often essential to class certification in securities suits.”). 
 134 Blair v. Equifax Check Serv., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 837–38 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(distinguishing conflicting suits from conflicting judgments, and finding that the former 
evades review). 
 135 Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that “a 
welter of district court decisions (many in this circuit) addressing the subject” had not 
reached appellate review). 
 136 Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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“fraud-on-the-market” securities claims;137 choice of law;138 Rule 
23(b)(2)’s application to defendant classes;139 stare decisis in class 
decisions;140 class action pollution cases;141 bankruptcy trustees as class 
representatives;142 individual litigation of damages claims;143 conversion 
of settlement classes into litigation classes;144 judicial estoppel in class 
action litigation;145 the need for individual causation hearings;146 
exhaustion of ERISA plan remedies;147 expert opinion evaluations;148 
individualized damage issues;149 and “deceptive act” liability.150 
4. Substantively Weak Decisions 
The relative strength of the district court certification decision plays 
differing roles in the circuits’ Rule 23(f) jurisprudence. For example, 
Blair suggests that, in order to accept a Rule 23(f) death knell appeal 
(either defendant’s or plaintiff’s), the moving party would have to 
present “a solid argument in opposition to the district court’s 
decision.”151 The Second Circuit adopts a similar standard, requiring 
appellants asserting death knells to make “a substantial showing that the 
district court’s decision is questionable,”152 and the D.C. Circuit requires 
a “questionable” certification decision as well.153 In contrast, the strength 
                                                                                                             
 137 West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002); Hevesi, 366 F.3d 
at 77–81. 
 138 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d at 1012, 
1015–16 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 139 Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 142 Dechert v. Cadle Co., 333 F.3d 801 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 143 Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 144 Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 145 Id. 
 146 In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 147 In re Household Int’l Tax Reduction Plan, 441 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 148 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. (In re Visa Check/Mastermoney 
Antitrust Litig.), 280 F.3d 124, 132 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Regents v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 380 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
 151 Blair v. Equifax Check Serv., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 152 In re Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 139 
(2d Cir. 2001). 
 153 In re James, 444 F.3d 643, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate 
Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also In re Delta Air Lines, 310 
F.3d 953, 960 (6th Cir. 2002) (requiring death knell applicants to show “some likelihood 
of success in overturning the class certification decision”); see also Waste Mgmt. 
Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir. 2000); accord Tilley v. TJX Cos., 
345 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[P]etitioners who seek to fit within the contours of this 
category also must demonstrate some significant weakness in the certification decision.”). 
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of the certification decision plays less of a factor in these circuits’ 
analyses of the legal development category, where importance of the 
issue dominates the inquiry.154 Other circuits use the strength of decision 
as a sliding factor, requiring a significant weakness showing when 
factors supporting appeal are absent, and less of a weakness showing 
when factors supporting appeal are present.155 
Some circuits argue that a particularly weak certification decision 
may, even without the presence of other factors, justify accepting appeal, 
particularly where “the district court expressly applies the incorrect Rule 
23 standard or overlooks directly controlling precedent.”156 The D.C. 
Circuit and Ninth Circuit adopt this principle by purporting to accept 
review of “manifestly erroneous” decisions:157 those that are “easily 
ascertainable from the petition itself,”158 and “virtually certain to be 
reversed on appeal from the final judgment.”159 Without this principle, 
“self-evidently defective classes would proceed through trial to final 
judgment, only to face certain decertification on appeal and a 
requirement that the process begin again from square one.”160 In addition 
to extreme cases where weakness alone justifies appeal, these circuits 
have determined that substantive weakness should make acceptance of 
other categories more likely, and vice-versa.161 In one decision, the Third 
Circuit proceeded with an interesting order of analysis, deciding 
“whether the District Court erred or whether, at this time, we should 
facilitate development of the law on class certification.”162 
Courts adopting strength of decision principles rarely indicate how 
to measure the “solid[ity]” of a plaintiff’s argument or the 
                                                                                                             
 154 Blair, 181 F.3d at 835; accord In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d at 960; In re 
Lorazepam, 289 F.3d at 105 (“[I]ssues of law can be advanced through affirmances as 
well as reversals”); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 262 F.3d at 139. 
 155 In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 960 (6th Cir. 2002) (referring to the strength 
of decision as the “likelihood of succeeding on the merits”). 
 156 Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis 
removed); accord Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2001); Lienhart 
v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[A] careful and sparing use of 
Rule 23(f) may promote judicial economy by enabling the correction of certain 
manifestly flawed class certifications prior to trial and final judgment.”) (emphasis 
removed). 
 157 Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2005); In re James, 
444 F.3d 643, 645–46 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re Allstate Ins. Co., No. 02-8010, 2002 WL 
31545753 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 2002); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 
289 F.3d 98, 99-100 (D.C. Cir. 2002); accord In re Bioproducts, Inc., No. 02-8006, 2002 
WL 1997993 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2002). 
 158 Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 959. 
 159 Id. at 962. 
 160 Lienhart, 255 F.3d at 145. 
 161 Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1275. 
 162 Barabin v. Aramark Corp., No. 02-8057, 2003 WL 355417 (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 2003). 
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“impervious[ness]” of a district court decision.163 In one Seventh Circuit 
decision, a “problematic” district court decision contributed to the 
acceptance of a Rule 23(f) death-knell appeal.164 The Seventh Circuit 
later equated weakness with novelty, arguing that “the case law teaches 
that the more novel the issue presented by the appeal and so the less 
likely that the district court’s resolution of it will stand . . . .”165 
The Coopers & Lybrand prediction of arbitrary results is generally 
true in this area, as well as in the legal development category. In these 
areas, the circuits’ jurisprudence has yielded results that are amenable to 
few, if any, principled distinctions. With respect to Coopers & Lybrand’s 
concern for preserving judicial resources,166 the published opinions 
themselves do not provide accurate evidence of how much docket 
pressure is attributable to Rule 23(f) appeals. However, the consideration 
of substantively weak decisions triggers more significant docket pressure 
than other categories. Unlike death knell situations, where litigants 
typically make some brief new showing of hardship, the judicial inquiry 
involved in the strength of decision analysis requires a higher order of 
judicial effort. In those cases, circuit judges and their staffs, in order to 
decide whether or not to accept an appeal, must review the merits of the 
district decision for error and place that error on some comparative scale. 
Thus, instead of using Rule 23(f) acceptance doctrines as a way of 
ensuring that review need not take place where it would be unnecessary 
and wasteful, this category of analysis turns the logic on its head, 
requiring in-depth consideration of district court decisions for all 
applications. 
5. District Court Postures 
Under a variety of labels, courts evaluate the status of district court 
proceedings when considering Rule 23(f) appeals. This category 
evaluates the procedural posture of a case and “the likelihood that future 
events may make immediate appellate review more or less 
appropriate.”167  Framed as the “nature and status of the litigation,” some 
courts focus on issues such as the progression of discovery, the 
completeness of a factual record, “the pendency of relevant motions, and 
                                                                                                             
 163 Commentators struggle similarly to identify some criteria for the strength of the 
lower court decision. See Kitchen, supra note 3, at 256–57. 
 164 Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 165 Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 166 Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 473–76. 
 167 Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000). Although Prado-
Steiman divides these into two separate factors, the upshot of the enumeration most often 
produces only a general discussion of lower court proceedings, and not a significantly 
bifurcated product. The analysis here conforms to that practice as well. 
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the length of time the matter already has been pending.”168 Another focus 
within this rubric is whether hearing an immediate appeal will streamline 
lower court litigation.169 For example, the Seventh Circuit accepted an 
appeal in part because it perceived that the appeal would expedite the 
resolution of a specific set of overlapping district court suits.170 
Courts also evaluate ongoing settlement negotiations, imminent 
changes in financial status, and district court indications of conditional or 
otherwise changing certifications.171 In one case, the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected an appeal concerning the plaintiff’s standing for several of these 
reasons, including an under-developed factual record, the potential for 
the plaintiff to remedy an adverse ruling on appeal with little effort, and 
the ability of the district court to change or amend the class at any 
time.172 However, less than one month later, and without elaboration, the 
same circuit accepted a Rule 23(f) appeal concerning a similar issue of 
named plaintiff’s standing.173 Some decisions grant review, at least in 
                                                                                                             
 168 Id.; accord Cason v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 28 F. App’x 392, 394 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (rejecting a Rule 23(f) appeal “[i]n view of the changes contemplated by the 
amended complaint, the expanded record, and the district court’s intention of 
recommencing class certification proceedings”); In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 960 
(6th Cir. 2002); see also In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., Ltd., 262 F.3d at 139–40 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“[I]ssues that would result at most in a modification of a certification order or 
whose ultimate resolution will depend on further factual development will be unlikely 
candidates for Rule 23(f) appeal.”). 
 169 In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 262 F.3d at 139 (arguing that “interlocutory review 
is particularly appropriate ‘when it promises to spare the parties and the district court the 
expense and burden of litigating the matter to final judgment only to have it inevitably 
reversed by this Court on appeal after final judgment’”); Murray v. GMAC Mortgage 
Corp., 434 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006); Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1276. 
 170 Murray, 434 F.3d at 951 (citing the fact that “about two score more of these suits” 
raising the same issue were pending at the district court); see also Hevesi v. Citigroup 
Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 80 n.9 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Although it is not central to our decision to 
grant the petition, we note that several [district] courts are currently grappling with the 
application of the [issue presented] . . . .”). 
 171 In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 961 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he certification of 
subclasses may be revisited at some point in the future, suggesting that interlocutory 
review is not appropriate.”); see Cason v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 28 F. App’x 
392, 394 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he efficient use of limited judicial resources suggests the 
district court should complete its class certification proceedings, especially where the 
initial class certification was conditional and the class was only generally defined.”); 
Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Liles v. Del 
Campo, 350 F.3d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 2003) (denying appeal because to allow appeal 
would “unnecessarily delay the resolution of the litigation and further jeopardize the 
limited assets available for resolving the claims”). 
 172 Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1278. 
 173 Carter v. W. Publ’g Co., 225 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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part, because briefing has already taken place,174 while others use a lack 
of briefing as a reason for denial.175 
6. Public Interest 
At least one circuit also considers the public interest in the 
resolution of a Rule 23(f) appeal. In its first Rule 23(f) decision,176 the 
Eleventh Circuit faced a lawsuit of “tremendous importance to thousands 
of developmentally-disabled persons in the State of Florida, many of 
whom have a critical need for prompt delivery of the services and 
benefits they claim to have been denied by the State.”177 The Prado-
Steiman court combined that interest with the public interest in 
“determining promptly the scope of the State’s administrative and 
financial obligations” to justify review of specific certification issues.178 
7. Hybrid Decisions 
Courts often accept Rule 23(f) appeals while citing to several 
categories of justifications.179  For example, one Seventh Circuit case 
invoked evidence of a defendant’s death knell, evidence of historical 
evasion of review, and a problematic district court decision, while 
omitting any precise decision calculus.180 Another cited evidence of a 
defendant’s death knell along with an important legal issue that might 
evade review.181 The First Circuit granted review of a homeowners’ class 
action against a loan corporation seeking damages and rescission of the 
loans because “of the important and unsettled legal issues involved and 
the substantial financial impact that the order portended.”182 
                                                                                                             
 174 Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys, Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 146 (4th Cir. 2001); Prado-Steiman, 
221 F.3d at 1278; Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004); 
Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2003); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. 
Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 291 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 175 In re Veneman, 309 F.3d 789, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 176 The unique nature of a circuit’s first decision may decrease its precedential weight. 
See, e.g.,  Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1278 (“Given these considerations, as well as the 
fact that we have not previously enunciated Rule 23(f) standards and the merits of this 
appeal have already been briefed and oral argument heard, we proceed to address certain 
aspects of the class certification ruling . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 177 Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1278. 
 178 Id. Soon after the Prado-Steiman decision, the Circuit heard a closely related 
appeal in Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 179 See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (citing concerns for a plaintiff’s death knell, defendant’s death knell, and 
important legal issues); Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2001); 
Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d. 
 180 Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675. 
 181 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d at 1015–16. 
 182 McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 421 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Commentary on the application of Rule 23(f) in the courts of 
appeals has been notable, yet disparate. Some suggest that applying strict 
Rule 23(f) standards in order to grant relatively few appeals disserves 
Congressional intent, arguing that Rule 23(f) ought not be interpreted to 
replicate other grants of appellate review such as 1292(b).183 However, 
the text of Rule 23(f) displays no favor for restrictive or liberal 
interpretations, and the analogy within the Committee Notes to the 
Supreme Court’s certiorari frameworks suggests that Rule 23(f), 
although intended to confer a genuine new power of appellate review, 
need not necessarily be interpreted to grant review of a relatively large 
number of class certification orders. Yet despite the facial discretion 
given to the circuits, the context of Rule 23(f) represents a legislative 
overruling of the Supreme Court’s Coopers & Lybrand decision, and 
probably supports expansive standards of acceptance.184 
Although Rule 23(f) may have been designed to encourage 
experimentation,185 the time has come for superior standards to emerge. 
Courts wishing to advance Rule 23(f) jurisprudence should focus on two 
fronts. First, courts should take time to always articulate why a particular 
appeal is rejected or accepted. Second, courts should clarify the 
procedural burdens that accompany each category of analysis, 
particularly for death knells, where courts should make clear what form 
of hardship showing must be made. Certain substantive categories 
require improvement as well—the legal development category ought to 
identify more principled distinctions between important and unimportant 
issues, and inquiries into the merits of district court decisions need to be 
circumscribed to include only the most readily identifiable errors. 
Otherwise, the multiple alternative avenues for appeals may suffice to 
provide adequate appellate review. With these modifications, the Rule 
23(f) jurisprudence can continue to develop around the most effective 
limiting principles and procedures. Finally, if the disparate Rule 23(f) 
standards among circuits remain, sophisticated litigants should expect to 
evaluate Rule 23(f) appealability as part of strategic forum shopping 
during class action litigation. 
                                                                                                             
 183 See Kitchen, supra note 3, at 253; see also supra Part III.B. 
 184 See Mackay, supra note 3, at 797. 
 185 See Kitchen, supra note 3, at 261 (arguing against standardization of class 
certification appeal standards and for continued experimentation). 
